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ABSTRACT. Recently the controversy about the police use of force has increased
within The Netherlands. Simultaneously it has become clear that courts have pro-
vided divergent judgments in these cases; some have sentenced and others have
acquitted police oﬃcers. Whereas victims of the police use of force increasingly ask
for the prosecution of these oﬃcials, others demand to change the reporting pro-
cedure in favor of the oﬃcer’s legal position. This research explains how the
reporting procedure for these cases is construed under Dutch law – particularly
regarding the serious use of force – seeing that such a contribution currently lacks in
(inter)national legal literature. Besides, it examines to what extent the abovemen-
tioned procedure violates the oﬃcer’s right against forced self-incrimination under
the ECHR. This research concludes, in absence of a court ruling, that the procedure
is incompatible with the ECHR when the evidence that follows from the oﬃcers’
duty to notify is admissible in criminal procedures.
I INTRODUCTION
During the last couple of years the controversy about the use of force
by Dutch policemen has increased within The Netherlands. Besides
the fact that these cases of police use of force have generated more
media attention, and civilians have increasingly asked for the prose-
cution of the police oﬃcers involved, it has also become apparent that
Dutch courts provide for remarkably diﬀerent judgments in these
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types of cases. This was illustrated most recently in July and August
2015. On 17th July a police oﬃcer was convicted by the District Court
of Limburg and sentenced to two years of imprisonment. The court
ruled that the oﬃcer had mistakenly believed that he and his col-
leagues were in danger when he decided to shoot at the suspect’s
vehicle. It was believed that this suspect had committed a crime the
night before. Besides, this suspect was also required to serve a year of
imprisonment and tried to escape at the time the police attempted to
arrest him. One of the passengers of the suspect’s vehicle was dan-
gerously – but not fatally – injured.1 On 5th August the District Court
of Rotterdam failed to convict two police oﬃcers for fatally shooting a
person whom the oﬃcers mistakenly, but – according to the court –
justiﬁably believed to be a great threat to his neighborhood.2
Especially after the ﬁrst mentioned judgment of the District Court
of Limburg, voices were raised to revise the present legislation
regarding the police use of force in order to ameliorate the legal
position of the police oﬃcer involved. First, on several occasions the
board of the National Police publically called for special legislation
for cases of police use of force, as opposed to cases of civilians who
have used force.3 The board also made clear that in future cases
policemen who have used their ﬁrearms would be provided with the
best lawyers.4 Secondly, the president of one of the largest Police
Unions, ACP, stated that following the judgment of the District
Court of Limburg a police oﬃcer who has used his ﬁrearm should
always be treated as a suspect – and not as a witness – because this
would provide the police oﬃcer with more legal certainty in future
court cases. Finally, a Dutch member of parliament belonging to the
largest political party – which is currently one of the two ruling
parties – posed questions to the Minister of Security and Justice
about the clarity and the limits of the present laws for policemen
regarding their permissible use of force and the legal position of these
1 Rb. Limburg 17 juli 2015, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:6059. Both the Public
Prosecution Service and the convicted policeman have lodged an appeal against this
decision.
2 Rb. Rotterdam 5 augustus 2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:6175.
3 See in this respect also the following contribution that was made 2 years before this
judgment, J. Naeye´, Een wettelijke strafuitsluitingsgrond voor rechtmatig aanhoud-
ingsgeweld’ in: J. W. Fokkens et al. (eds.), Ad hunc modum. Opstellen over materieel
strafrecht (Liber amicorum A.J. Machielse) (Deventer: Kluwer, 2013), 238. Further-
more, see J.Naeye´,Deorganisatie vandeNationalePolitie (Deventer:Kluwer, 2014), 189.
4 Since the beginning of November 2015 a ‘‘group of 19 top lawyers’’ has been
installed at the request of the National Police.
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oﬃcers in proceedings subsequent to their ﬁrearm use.5 This makes us
wonder how the Dutch legislation regarding the police use of force is
currently shaped in cases of serious use of force and which legal
problems may arise in light of it.
Article 17 (1) of theDutch 1994 Police Instructions (Ambtsinstructie
voor de politie, de Koninklijke marechaussee en andere opspor-
ingsambtenaren, Police Instructions)6 obliges a police oﬃcer who has
used force to immediately report this to his superior. In view of his oath
of oﬃce, a police oﬃcer will always (have to) do this truthfully.7 In case
of noncompliance with these oﬃcial directives he risks disciplinary
sanctions.8 His superior then codiﬁes this report on the prescribed
notiﬁcation form.9 At the same time Articles 152 and 153 Dutch Code
of Criminal Procedure (DCCP)10 compel a police oﬃcer to truthfully
report about his actions and ﬁndings in an oﬃcial report (proces-ver-
baal). If his oﬃcial report does not correspond with the truth he can be
charged with perjury, a crime that according to Article 207 (1) Dutch
Penal Code (DPC)11 is punished with a maximum of 6 years of
imprisonment and a ﬁne of the fourth category.12 One might wonder
how this relates to the right against forced self-incrimination. At least
according to the Dutch government no such problem exists under the
present procedure.
5 See the document kv-tk-2015Z14386. She also posed questions about the pos-
sibilities to reform the present system.
6 Stb. 1994, 275, Directives for oﬃce holders in law enforcement.
7 See for this oath Art. 9 (1) Besluit algemene rechtspositie politie (BARP), Stb.
1994, 214: ‘‘Ik zweer (beloof) dat ik mij zal gedragen zoals een goed ambtenaar
betaamt, dat ik zorgvuldig, onkreukbaar en betrouwbaar zal zijn en dat ik niets zal
doen dat het aanzien van het ambt zal schaden.’’ In English this oath comes down to
the following: act as a good civil servant, be careful, unimpeachable, and reliable and
do not harm the oﬃce.
8 J. Naeye´, Nederlands Politierecht. Tekst en commentaar 2009–2010 (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer, 2009), 385. See also Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 19535, nr. 5, p. 26.
and Art. 76 BARP. Art. 77 BARP mentions the sanctions that are at hand, for
instance a reduction of salary, suspension or dismissal.
9 This form is attached to the Regeling melding geweldaanwending, Stcrt. 2001, 168.
Although the Minister of Security and Justice withdrew this document on 13th
December 2012 (Stcrt. 2012, 26854) the Ministry of Security and Justice has in-
formed us this notiﬁcation form is still in use until further notice.
10 Stb. 1921, 14.
11 Stb. 1881, 35.
12 According to Art. 23 DPC a ﬁne of the fourth category is equal to e 20.250,-.
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Following the amendment to the Police Instructions in 2001 a
police oﬃcer no longer has to ﬁll in the prescribed notiﬁcation form
himself.13 The Explanatory Memorandum to this amendment makes
clear that this change was needed in order to prevent self-incrimi-
nation on the part of the oﬃcer. From that moment there is no
explicitly prescribed way in which police use of force has to be re-
ported. Basically, it can suﬃce with an oral report from the oﬃcer to
his superior,14 although internal guidelines may require him to record
it in a diﬀerent way.15 As a further consequence of the amendment a
police oﬃcer is no longer obliged to report why he has chosen to use
force. Following the amendment an oﬃcer solely needs to report
about the facts, the circumstances and the consequences of the force
used.
When a police oﬃcer’s use of force has caused lethal casualties
amongst civilians or injuries for which they needed medical treat-
ment,16 or when the use of force involved a ﬁrearm shooting, Article
17 (3) Police Instructions requires the police chief of the regional unit
or the national unit17 (police chief) to refer the notiﬁcation form to
the public prosecutor. Hereafter this research refers to these situa-
tions as serious use of force. In reaction to this referral, the public
prosecutor will initiate an investigation, which is carried out by the
independent National Police Internal Investigations Department
(Rijksrecherche, NPIID).18 The NPIID investigates the matter and
whilst doing so it does not use the notiﬁcation form, which is in
accordance with its internal policy. The NPIID reports its ﬁndings to
the public prosecutor. During the (subsequent) investigation the
police oﬃcer may not be compelled to cooperate.19 However, the
public prosecutor can request to use the notiﬁcation form and the
oﬃcial police report that was made by the oﬃcer as evidence on the
basis of Article 105 (1) DCCP. The superior to whom the report was
13 Stb. 2001, 387, p. 9.
14 Ibid. That this no longer has to be done in writing can be extrapolated from the
words of the Explanatory Memorandum. It describes the former procedure as ‘‘re-
porting in writing’’ (schriftelijk melden) as opposed to reporting (op de hoogte
brengen/melden). See also Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 518.
15 Naeye´ 2009 (n 8 above), 386; Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 519.
16 Naeye´ 2009 (n 8 above), 387; Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 519.
17 Stb. 2012, 458, p. 7; Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 76.
18 Para. 3A (II) and (III) Stcrt. 2010, 20477.
19 Stb. 2001, 387, p. 10.
MARC GROENHUIJSEN AND RENE´ JANSEN498
made can also be summoned to testify during the pre-trial investi-
gation,20 or he may be required to do so in court later on.
This leads us to the following problem. First it is important to
realize that it is the duty of a police oﬃcer to react to the unlawful
conduct of civilians in order to stop it. This could ultimately mean
that the oﬃcer has to use severe force, whereas ordinary civilians can
choose to ﬂee in such situations.21 The abovementioned demonstrates
that after he has used severe force, a police oﬃcer might in actual fact
initiate a criminal investigation against himself by reporting his use of
force in accordance with Article 17 (1) and (3) Police Instructions. In
other words: it might be that the Police Instructions’ obligation to
report to a certain extent leads to self-incrimination on behalf of the
police oﬃcer in situations of serious use of force because his state-
ments can be used against him in a subsequent criminal trial. It has
been argued before that this is at odds with the privilege against
forced self-incrimination22 as it emerges from the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court).23 Neverthe-
less, until this moment no extensive study has been conducted on this
issue. Legal scholars have made observations regarding the compat-
ibility of such a course of events with the case law of the ECtHR,
however, in relation to the reporting procedure for medical doctors
who performed euthanasia on their patient. This research therefore
analyzes the extent in which this reporting procedure is similar to that
of police oﬃcers in case of serious use of force and, if so, what this
means for the compatibility of the reporting procedure for police
oﬃcers’ serious use of force with the case law of the ECtHR.
The main question in this research is to what extent the Police
Instructions’ obligation to report in situations of serious use of force
is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention). This research solely
focuses on the Article 17 (3) Police Instructions cases because then
the police chief is compelled to report those cases to the public
prosecutor. That way we assure that we solely examine the situation
20 See also para. 5.2 Stcrt. 2006, 143.
21 J. Naeye, Niet zonder slag of stoot: De geweldsbevoegdheid en doorzettingskracht
van de Nederlandse politie (Zeist: Kerckebosch, 2005), 46–47; Naeye´ 2009 (n 8
above), 70.
22 This prohibition not to incriminate oneself is also known as the principle of
nemo tenetur (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare). This research will use both terms.
23 J. S. Timmer, J. Naeye´, and M. van der Steeg, Onder schot. Het vuurwapenge-
bruik van de politie in Nederland (1978–1995) (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1996), 71.
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in which contact is established with the Public Prosecution Service
and, thus, the area of criminal law is reached. Thus Article 17 (3) (a)
is kept out of the scope of this research because it involves cases in
which the police chief himself ﬁnds it appropriate to inform the public
prosecutor, and therefore these cases are subjected to his personal
appraisal. In other words: this research will only focus on sections (b)
about civilian lethal casualties or injuries for which medical treatment
was needed and (c) about the oﬃcer’s shooting of ﬁrearms.
First this research explains the legal position of the police oﬃcer
under the Police Instructions’ reporting procedure for the police use
of force (Police Instructions’ reporting procedure). Next it compares
this procedure with the reporting procedure for medical doctors who
performed euthanasia on their patient (euthanasia reporting proce-
dure). For both procedures this research discusses their compatibility
with the case law of the ECtHR and the comments and criticism they
face in relation to the right against forced self-incrimination. It also
aims to determine, in relation to the serious use of force by police
oﬃcers, whether a genuine problem is at stake here. This is partly
endeavored on the basis of a questionnaire circulated among lawyers
who have represented policemen in court proceedings subsequent to
their use of force. Finally, some main ﬁndings will be presented in a
concluding part.
II POLICE USE OF FORCE AND THE POLICE
INSTRUCTIONS’ REPORTING PROCEDURE
2.1 The Legal Basis and Examination of Police Use of Force
The State has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a
democratic society that is governed by the rule of law. As regards its
internal aﬀairs and security, the police primarily exercises this
authority. The police may only use force when it is necessary for the
execution of its duties. Since the use of force infringes upon the hu-
man and civil rights of the State’s residents, e.g. Article 2 (Right to
life) and 3 (Prohibition of torture) ECHR, it is a delicate tool that
should be used modestly and monitored eﬀectively, adequately and
independently.24
The Constitution of the Kingdom of The Netherlands does not
contain a provision regarding the right to life. It does, however,
24 Judgment in case of Ramsahai and Others v. The Netherlands, 15 May 2007,
European Court of Human Rights (No. 52391/99).
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comprise the following Article 11 upon which the (serious) use of
force by the police infringes: ‘‘Everyone shall have the right to invi-
olability of his person, without prejudice to restrictions laid down by
or pursuant to Act of Parliament’’.25 Thus the power to limit this
right only rests with Parliament. If it wants to use this power, it must
adopt a Statutory Act that provides the legal basis for such a limi-
tation. With respect to the use of force by the police it has done so in
Article 7 of the Dutch Police Act (Politiewet 2012, DPA).26
According to Article 7 (1) DPA a police oﬃcer is authorized to
use force when this is justiﬁed in light of the aim pursued (requirement
of proportionality) and when no other measures are available
(requirement of subsidiarity).27 Furthermore, section (5) of this Article
requires the use of force to be reasonable (requirement of propor-
tionality) and moderate (requirement of subsidiarity) in relation to the
pursued aim. As a result the requirements of proportionality and
subsidiarity are two fold in this provision. The oﬃcer must choose the
least drastic measure and he must use it as a last resort. This means
that in order to stop an unarmed thief a brief headlock is preferred
over the extensive use of a gun. Moreover an oﬃcer’s use of force
must be justiﬁed and at the same time reasonable. Likewise there is
no need to arrest the thief by force when he hands himself in spon-
taneously.
On the basis of Article 9 (1) and (3) DPA the Dutch government
can adopt further decentralized legislation in order to regulate the
police use of force in more detail. In this respect it has issued the
Police Instructions. This document contains instructions for police
oﬃcers regarding the use of diﬀerent types of violent tools. It also
outlines which reporting procedure follows in case of the use of force
by the police.
Police use of force is always examined a posteriori. On several
occasions the Dutch government made it clear that it wants the police
use of force to be examined on the basis of the criteria of propor-
25 Government of the Netherlands, The Constitution of the Government of The
Netherlands 2008 (Government of the Netherlands, 18 October 2012), available at
http://www.government.nl/ﬁles/documents-and-publications/regulations/2012/10/
18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008/the-constitution-of-the-
kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.pdf, (last accessed 13 April 2016).
26 Stb. 2012, 315.
27 Naeye´ 2009 (n 8 above), 68. This is no autonomous competence; the actions
have to be authorized and lawful and the use of force has to be necessary and
inevitable.
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tionality and subsidiarity. In order to restrict this use of force as
much as possible it demands the fulﬁlment of these objective crite-
ria.28 Although it accepts that these requirements are not self-evident
for both the police oﬃcer and the civilian, the government believes it
is inherent to the police task that the assessment of the police use of
force takes place in light of the circumstances of the case and on the
basis of these criteria at a later stage.29
In case of the police use of force Article 17 (1) Police Instructions
obliges the oﬃcer who has used force to immediately report the facts,
the circumstances and the consequences of his actions to his superior.
We have already seen that at that stage it can suﬃce with an oral
statement from the oﬃcer. However, his duty to produce an oﬃcial
report in writing about his actions and ﬁndings on the basis of Article
152 and 153 DCCP remains intact, though the legislator has left it
open for the court to decide how to respond to a violation of Article
152 DCCP.30 Additionally, a police oﬃcer who has used force can be
required to register the event in the computer database. This depends
on internal instructions, provided that they are not incompatible with
Article 17 Police Instructions.31
The superior records the oﬃcer’s notiﬁcation on a prescribed
form together with his judgment on the legality of the oﬃcer’s ac-
tions and the compatibility of these actions with the Police
Instructions. He, for instance, notes whether the oﬃcer wore a
uniform during his use of force. The superior also notes whether the
oﬃcer acted on his own initiative, whether he provided the civilian
with a warning, what kind of force he used, what the purpose was
for which the oﬃcer used force and what the consequences of the
force used were. This form is characterized by the fact that most of
the questions it poses have a ﬁxed number of possible answers
(besides the answer other, namely…’). This does not apply, how-
ever, to the question relating to the exact description of the course
of events during which the violence was used; here there is an open
space in which the answer must be completed. Who this superior is
that ﬁlls in the form diﬀers depending on the regional police unit.32
According to Article 1 (2) (a) Police Instructions the superior is the
28 Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 19535, nr. 5, p. 44.
29 Ibid, p. 27.
30 HR 19 december 1995, NJ 1996, 249.
31 Naeye´ 2009 (n 8 above), 386. See also Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 518.
32 Naeye 2005 (n 21 above), 66.
MARC GROENHUIJSEN AND RENE´ JANSEN502
oﬃcial who is actually in charge. If this does not provide immediate
clarity, section (b) describes the superior as the oﬃcial with the
highest rank or, in case of equal ranks, the oﬃcial with the most
years of service (seniority).
Later on, yet another oﬃcial makes the ﬁnal judgment on the
legality of the used force. For the less severe cases it depends on the
unit to which this task is assigned.33 It is usually the police chief
who assesses the used force and decides whether or not an internal,
disciplinary or criminal investigation is initiated. In the last case
scenario he passes the notiﬁcation form on to the public prosecu-
tor.34 As regards the serious use of force cases however, the pro-
cedure is ﬁxed. The police chief must inform the public prosecutor
of the court’s district where the violent actions took place of the
notiﬁcation made by the oﬃcer who has used force within 48 h.35
Then the public prosecutor decides whether the police oﬃcer must
be treated as a witness or as a suspect by the NPIID in the sub-
sequent investigation.36 In the end, when the investigation is com-
pleted, the chief public prosecutor has the authority to decide about
the legality of the oﬃcer’s actions and whether (further) prosecution
is warranted.37 If a ﬁrearm was used he must submit his decision to
a special advisory committee (Adviescommissie politieel vuur-
wapengebruik),38 although the advice of this committee is not
binding.
For a full understanding of the procedure, it has to be noted that a
criminal investigation does not exclude the possibility that simulta-
neously an internal police investigation is conducted, out of which
disciplinary sanctions may follow.39 This research will not elaborate
further on this matter.
Seeing that the notiﬁcation form and other oﬃcial reports, as well
as the testimony of the superior, can be used as evidence in a criminal
33 G. Drenth et al., Sturing en toetsing van de politie¨le geweldsbevoegdheid (Kracht
van meer dan geringe betekenis, Apeldoorn: Politie & Wetenschap, 2008), 73.
34 De Nationale ombudsman, Verantwoord politiegeweld (Den Haag, de Nationale
Ombudsman, 2013), 19.
35 Art. 17 (3) Police Instructions.
36 Para. 4.6 Stcrt. 2006, 143.
37 Para. 5.1 Stcrt. 2006, 143; J. S. Timmer, Politiegeweld. Geweldgebruik van en
tegen de politie in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2005), 208. See also
Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 519.
38 Para. 5.4 Stcrt. 2006, 143.
39 Timmer (n 37 above), 188.
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investigation or trial, this research will now examine a police oﬃcer’s
legal position under the Police Instructions in case of serious use of
force.
2.2 The Legal Position of the Police Oﬃcer
From the beginning of the 1980’s until 2000 the oﬃcer who had used
serious force and thereby shot and injured or killed a civilian, or
threatened to use his ﬁrearm, was always treated as a suspect in police
investigations.40 This changed shortly before the amendment to the
Police Instructions in August 2001.41 It is clear that when a police
oﬃcer uses serious force he literally commits a criminal oﬀence out of
the DPC.42 However, following the policy measure of the executive
board of the Public Prosecution Service that was issued on 16th May
200043 the current general reasoning is that because the oﬃcer acted
on a statutory basis,44 or on the basis of his superior’s command,45 he
is exempt from criminal liability. This means that his actions are
justiﬁed and, therefore, he is treated as a witness during the NPIID
investigation.46 But does this mean he can never be seen as a suspect?
First it is important to explain the Police Instructions’ reporting
procedure in relation to the DCCP and the moment in which the sus-
pect plays a role. A starting point for the application of the provisions
of the DCCP is the investigation stage (opsporing). From that moment
on, the actions that the authorities take must have a statutory basis.47
According to Article 132a DCCP this phase starts when the investi-
gation, under the supervision of the public prosecutor, regarding
criminal actions for the purpose of criminal procedural decision mak-
ing begins. This means that, for instance, it starts when the authorities
have probable cause that someone has performed a criminal action.
Here is where the legal position of the suspect comes in.
40 Timmer, Naeye´ and Van der Steeg (n 23 above), 69; Timmer (n 37 above), 194.
41 Stb. 2001, 387.
42 For instance attempted homicide, wrongful death or aggravated assault.
43 Naeye´ 2005 (n 21 above), 48; Timmer (n 37 above), 194–195; J. van Schie and P.
Vermaas, ‘Niet langer automatisch verdachte na geweldsincident. Instructie positie
politiefunctionaris bij geweldsaanwending aangepast’, (2000) 15 Algemeen Politie-
blad 6. This policy measure is currently replaced by Stcrt. 2006, 143.
44 Art. 42 DPC.
45 Art. 43 DPC.
46 Para. 4.3 Stcrt. 2006, 143.
47 Art. 1 DCCP.
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According to Article 27 DCCP a suspect is someone against
whom, on the basis of facts and circumstances, a reasonable suspicion
of a criminal action comes forward. A suspect has the right to remain
silent on the basis of Article 29 (1) DCCP and he must be informed of
this right before the interrogation by the police oﬃcers begins on the
basis of Article 29 (2) DCCP. On the one hand, a suspect can invoke
several procedural safeguards, such as the right to silence and the
right to an attorney. On the other hand, the authorities can use
coercive means against a suspect, such as police detention and cus-
tody. For a full understanding of the DCCP in relation to the Police
Instructions’ reporting procedure it is important to note that nowhere
in the DCCP is there a speciﬁc provision as regards police witness
interrogation. This means that any such questioning can only happen
on a voluntary basis, even though an unwilling witness can be sum-
moned and compelled to testify on the basis of Article 210 or 260 (1)
DCCP in front of a judge during later stages of the procedure.48
Police oﬃcers generally prefer not to be treated as a suspect during
investigations regarding their use of force.49 Their general mind-set is
that they have acted according to the law and in line with the task
assigned to them. As a result they do not want to be treated as a
suspect. This holds even if and when it means that they cannot invoke
the rights a suspect has during a criminal investigation. The fact that
their statements as a witness can be used against them in a subsequent
criminal trial – because they cannot invoke the procedural safeguards
of a suspect at the moment of their witness testimony – has been duly
noted above.50
The use of police force investigation parts from the assumption of
a legitimate use of force by the oﬃcer. This means that as long as
there are no reasons for doubting the lawfulness of his behavior he
will be treated as a witness. The earlier mentioned relevant guidelines
of the executive board of the Public Prosecution Service make it clear
that at that stage it is not necessary, and certainly not desirable, to
treat the oﬃcer as a suspect. The same goes for situations where a
48 G. J. M. Corstens and M. J. Borgers, Het Nederlands strafprocesrecht, 8th edn
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2014), 319.
49 Nationale ombudsman 2013 (n 34 above), 37; Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 186.
50 Timmer, Naeye´ and Van der Steeg (n 23 above), 69; Timmer (n 37 above), 198;
J. ten Voorde, Politieel vuurwapengeweld in rechte beoordeeld’, (2014) 5 Ars Aequi
346, 351. Ten Voorde explains the police oﬃcer as a witness has no right to a lawyer
or the inspection of documents. Though his comments do not go any further than
that this policy might be in a need for change.
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police oﬃcer has not acted in accordance with the Police Instructions,
but where he can apply for (other) exemptions from criminal liabil-
ity.51 This means that in general the oﬃcer is questioned as a witness
by the NPIID within 24 h after the event took place. Nonetheless, at
the beginning of the hearing the NPIID informs him that he does not
have to answer questions that may incriminate him. And the NPIID
will treat the oﬃcer as a suspect when it is not (or: no longer) beyond
reasonable doubt that his actions were legitimate, or when the cir-
cumstances surrounding the event are not suﬃciently clear at the time
of the ﬁrst hearing.52
Prior to the amendment to the Police Instructions in 2001 the police
oﬃcer himself had to ﬁll in the notiﬁcation form, in writing, and submit
it to his superior. Back then the oﬃcer also had to explain the reasons
for his actions. Since the amendment, neither a police oﬃcer nor his
superior53 has to state the reasons for the necessity and inevitability of
his use of force.54 Following the amendment to Article 17 the superior
must record the (oral) report on the prescribed notiﬁcation form.
Consequently, it is the superior who is responsible for its content. That
way the police oﬃcer is placed at a certain distance from the creation of
the document and the establishment of the facts.55 However, as men-
tioned earlier it is still possible that a police oﬃcer may have the obli-
gation to record his use of force in diﬀerent ways as well.
The Dutch government believes that the present procedure pre-
vents forced self-incrimination on behalf of the police oﬃcer. It
claims a balance is created between the need to provide information
on the one hand, and preventing self-incrimination on the other,
when a police oﬃcer merely reports the facts and circumstances of the
force used. Furthermore it underlines that a police oﬃcer cannot be
forced to cooperate in a subsequent criminal investigation, although
this might be diﬀerent during disciplinary investigations,56 and that
the public prosecutor must return the notiﬁcation form to the supe-
rior when he decides to prosecute the police oﬃcer.57 This can only be
51 Para. 4.3 Stcrt. 2006, 143. For instance in the case of self-defense.
52 Art. 29 (2) DCCP. See also para. 4.4 Stcrt. 2006, 143.
53 In this respect question 22 of the notiﬁcation form provides for further expla-
nation.
54 Naeye´ 2009 (n 8 above), 386–387. See also Naeye´ 2014 (n 3 above), 518.
55 Stb. 2001, 387, p. 9–10.
56 Ibid, p. 10.
57 Stb. 1994, 275, Explanatory Memorandum to Art. 17.
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understood in the light of the oﬃcer’s right to silence from the mo-
ment he is a suspect.
In their 1996 research Timmer and others conclude that in case of
the police use of force neither Article 17 Police Instructions nor
Article 152 DCCP violates a police oﬃcer’s right to silence. They
make clear that this right solely belongs to a suspect, and that a police
oﬃcer who reports about his use of force to his superior does not
qualify as a suspect under Article 27 DCCP. They explain that, al-
though an oﬃcer is free to do so, a refusal to report his used force is
inconsistent with Article 152 DCCP and Article 17 Police Instruc-
tions and, therefore, the oﬃcer risks disciplinary sanctions. However,
these sanctions should not force the oﬃcer to report because this
would violate his right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR.58 Despite
the fact that police oﬃcers can refuse to report their used force this
rarely happens in practice.59 Timmer and others determine it is more
likely that an oﬃcer who refuses to report will produce incomplete or
incorrect statements, though in that case the oﬃcer risks charges for
perjury.60
2.3 A Diﬀerence Between Theory and Practice
Normally the police succeeds in performing its duties without the use
of force.61 However, during the last couple of years the use of force
by the police has increased due to diverging perceptions between
police oﬃcers and civilians,62 as did the notiﬁcations of oﬃcers about
their use of ﬁrearms and truncheons.63 Now the key question is how
58 Timmer, Naeye´ and Van der Steeg (n 23 above), 69–71, See the judgment in case
of Funke v France, 25 February 1993, European Court of Human Rights (No. 10828/
84).
59 Nationale ombudsman 2013 (n 34 above), 48.
60 J Naeye´, Heterdaad. Politiebevoegdheden bij ontdekking op heterdaad in theorie
en praktijk, 2nd edn (Arnhem/Lochem: Gouda Quint/Van den Brink, 1990), 255;
Timmer, Naeye´ and Van der Steeg (n 23 above), 70.
61 De Nationale ombudsman, Voorbij het conﬂict. Verslag van de Nationale
ombudsman over 2009 (de Nationale ombudsman 2010), 16; This approach is in line
with the notion of ultimum remedium under Art. 7 DPA.
62 G. van den Brink and G. van Os, Tweezijdige behoorlijkheid’ in: A. F. M.
Brenninkmeijer (ed.), Werken aan behoorlijkheid. De Nationale ombudsman in zijn
context (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2007), 148–168.
63 P. Kruize et al., Politie¨le bewapening in perspectief: Over gebruik en eﬀectiviteit
van pepperspray & wapenstok (Amsterdam: Ateno, Bureau voor Criminaliteitsanal-
yse, 2012), 44.
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these reports are made. Are they made in line with the Police
Instructions, or has a diﬀerent method developed in practice?
Naeye´ points out that in the year 2000, so one year before the
amendment to the Police Instructions, 42.9% of the serious use of
force cases (740 out of 1724) were sent to the public prosecutor. This
led to 624 traceable assessments by the chief public prosecutor, out of
which 66 negative ones followed.64 So based on this data, 8.9% of the
referred notiﬁcations were dismissed. Besides, police oﬃcers were
prosecuted eighteen times, which led to a settlement in eight cases and
a guilty verdict and sentence in ﬁve cases.65 As regards the year 2005,
Drenth and others’ limited research illustrates that in 29.2% (7 out of
24) of the serious police use of force cases the notiﬁcation form was
sent to the public prosecutor.66 The research of Drenth and others also
ﬁnds that 64% of the total of 1696 questioned oﬃcers admits to never
ﬁlling in notiﬁcation forms, which means that one third of them is still
to a greater or lesser extent involved in the completion of the forms.67
The Dutch National Ombudsman made additional remarkable
observations. First, in line with the research of Drenth and others he
points out that in practice it still occurs that police oﬃcers ﬁll in the
form themselves. He makes it clear that oﬃcers continue to report
about the context of their used force and their emotional feelings.
This information is recorded and taken into account when the used
force is evaluated. Secondly, he notes that the superior oﬃcer
sometimes attaches his advice to the notiﬁcation form.68 This obvi-
ously goes beyond the instructions of the government. In this respect
it is striking that the National Ombudsman recommends to describe
and take into account the oﬃcer’s feelings and the situational context
when use of police force is assessed.69 We realize that on some
occasions this kind of information can be used in favor of the police
oﬃcer. However, such a use does not fall under the rules of evidence
under the DCCP. When we talk about criminal evidence – which is
inherently not in favor of the suspect’s legal position – this infor-
mation can also be used against this oﬃcer in order to qualify the
used force as an intentional crime, when this is allowed by the DCCP.
64 Naeye´ 2005 (n 21 above), 424–427.
65 Ibid, 426–427.
66 Drenth et al. (n 33 above), 77.
67 Ibid, 70.
68 Nationale ombudsman 2013 (n 34 above), 35–36.
69 Ibid, 7.
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So the core question is: to what extent is the notiﬁcation form and
the testimony of the superior admissible as evidence against the
oﬃcer, taking into account that they are derived from the police
oﬃcers’ obligation to report under the Police Instructions? And does
it make any diﬀerence only when this relates to the facts, circum-
stances and consequences of the severe use of force, or also to the
context and the emotional feelings of the oﬃcer? The problem is that
at present very little is written and no case law exists in relation to this
speciﬁc issue. In order to obtain arguments that could help to provide
an answer to this question, this research examines – by analogy – a
reporting procedure in which the notiﬁcation form and the situational
context are always taken into account in the judgment regarding the
legality of the performed actions, namely the one that relates to
medical doctors who perform euthanasia on their patient in The
Netherlands. These medical doctors are most of the time general
practitioners (huisartsen) who have known their patients for some
time already. Subsequently, this research analyzes the compatibility
of the Police Instructions’ reporting procedure in the case of serious
use of force with the case law of the ECtHR.
To be clear, we do not want to position police oﬃcers who have
used severe force (or medical doctors who have performed eu-
thanasia) above the law, nor do we want to prevent that their
unlawful behavior could ever be sanctioned. The argument we make
here is that every suspect should be treated equally before the law,
irrespective of his profession or other discriminatory grounds. One
of the rights a suspect has is the right against forced self-incrimi-
nation. As it will be discussed in the following chapters, the noti-
ﬁcation form and the testimony of superiors are almost never used
as evidence in a criminal trial. Though, at the same time, these
sources of information are self-incriminating for the police oﬃcial
who has provided this information – following his duty to do so –
as a witness and is later confronted with this same evidence during a
criminal trial in which he is a suspect. So when it is clear that a
public prosecutor can use – and normally does use – other pieces of
evidence during the prosecution of a police oﬃcer who has
unlawfully used severe force (such as witness testimonies of by-
standers and security cameras images), why not exclude the notiﬁ-
cation form and the testimony of the superior as evidence in court?
In our opinion the exclusion of the notiﬁcation form and the tes-
timony of the superior as evidence in court against the reporting
oﬃcer, will maximize the willingness of police oﬃcers to report
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truthfully about their use of force (and will thus optimize the way in
which the monopoly on violence can be monitored).
Noting that this has not been debated by legal scholars in relation
to the police reporting procedure, this research now discusses the
legislation and scholarly debate regarding the Dutch euthanasia
procedure and the legal position of the medical doctor, in order to
determine whether interesting observations can be made that support
or contradict the arguments we have made above.
III EUTHANASIA AND THE REPORTING PROCEDURE
FOR MEDICAL DOCTORS
3.1 The Legal Basis and Examination of Euthanasia
It is incorrect to think – as many people still do – that unconditional
euthanasia is allowed underDutch law.70 It still is a crime deﬁned as the
termination of life by amedical doctor at the request of a patient which
under Article 293 DPC is punished with twelve years of imprisonment
and a ﬁne of the ﬁfth category at its maximum.71However, between the
1970s and 2002 theDutch judiciary developed in its case law a standard
set of strict conditions under which a medical doctor (euthanasia
doctor) can justiﬁably perform euthanasia on his patient.72 The Dutch
euthanasia legislation,with its keyAct being theTerminationofLife on
Request and Assisted Suicide Act (Wet toetsing levensbee¨indiging op
verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding, WTL),73 is – as the government describes
it – the codiﬁcation of this case law.74 Central to this Act are the two
conﬂicting values a medical doctor faces when he decides upon the
euthanasia request of his patient, namely the protection of human life
on the one hand and respecting a severely suﬀering person’s wish to die
in a digniﬁedmanner on the other. Also, this Act aims to provide more
legal certainty for both themedical doctor and the patient and it aims to
improve themonitoring of euthanasia cases by placing the area of penal
law at a certain distance.75
70 M. S. Groenhuijsen and F. van Laanen, Euthanasia in international and com-
parative perspective (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006).
71 According to Art. 23 DPC a ﬁne of the ﬁfth category is equal to e 81.000.
72 E. Pans, De normatieve grondslagen van het Nederlandse euthanasierecht (Ni-
jmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), 28.
73 Stb. 2001, 194. See also Art. 9 (1) and (2).
74 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 26691, nr. 9, p. 16.
75 Ibid, p. 18.
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Before the creation of the WTL the Dutch judiciary had developed
a set of criteria under which a doctor could invoke the exemption
from criminal liability on the basis of Article 40 DPC (duress). At
present, Article 293 (2) DPC contains a special ground for the
exemption from criminal liability which can only be invoked by the
euthanasia doctor. In order to do so this doctor must have acted in
accordance with the statutory due care criteria speciﬁed in Article 2
WTL and the duty to report on the basis of Article 7 (2) Burial and
Cremation Act (Wet op de lijkbezorging, WLB).76 As a result this
involves a cumulative provision: both requirements have to be ful-
ﬁlled by the euthanasia doctor. We will now explain what the
reporting procedure under the WTL exactly entails.
When a medical doctor euthanizes a patient he must report this
without delay to the municipal coroner on the basis of Article 293 (2)
DPC and Article 7 (2) WLB. At that moment the euthanasia doctor
provides the municipal coroner with a completed notiﬁcation form
and a well-reasoned report about the course of events and the non-
natural death of the patient.77 In this report he replies to open
questions, regarding the means he has used and the assessments he
has made during the process, for example. In this respect it diﬀers
from the notiﬁcation form that is used in the police reporting pro-
cedure, where the possible answers are to some extent ﬁxed. Simul-
taneously the municipal coroner informs the public prosecutor in
writing about this euthanasia death78 without expressing his judg-
ment on the carefulness of the doctor’s actions, although the public
prosecutor can request him to do so. Then the public prosecutor
decides whether the body is free to be buried or cremated. Finally, the
municipal coroner also sends the notiﬁcation form and the report to
the competent regional euthanasia review committee (Regionale
toetsingscommissie, RRC).79
As a next step, it is usually the RRC that examines the case.
This committee is composed of three members: a legal member
(chairman), a medical member and an ethical member.80 This
committee decides whether the actions of the medical doctor were
in line with the statutory due care criteria out of Article 2 (1)
76 Stb. 1991, 130.
77 Art. 7 (2) WLB. Stb. 2002, 140: in the appendix the model form can be found.
78 Art. 10 WLB.
79 Stcrt. 2012, 26899.
80 Art. 3 (2) WTL.
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WTL. The committee decides in one of the three following man-
ners. First, it can ﬁnd that the actions of the doctor were consistent
with the statutory due care criteria and thus legitimate. In that case
it informs the Public Prosecution Service of its judgment and the
case ends here. This means no further investigations are conducted
by the Public Prosecution Service, apart from in the case that new
facts arise or a civilian reports a crime. Secondly, the RRC can rule
it is not competent to decide on the matter when (it is believed
that) no request for euthanasia was made by the patient. In that
case it refers the case back to the municipal coroner and it requests
him to inform the public prosecutor. Thirdly, the RRC can hold
that the doctor’s actions were not in accordance with the due care
criteria.81 Then it sends its judgment together with a copy of the
case ﬁle to the Assembly of General Procurators. On the basis of
Article 10 WTL, the RRC is obliged to provide the public prose-
cutor at his request the information he needs to assess the doctor’s
actions.
This procedure has various implications on the chances of criminal
investigation by the Public Prosecution Service. Article 2 (1) WTL is
a codiﬁcation of the case law as regards the substantive and proce-
dural requirements the euthanasia doctors must fulﬁl in order to
successfully invoke the exemption from criminal liability under
Article 40 DPC. This means that if the RRC rules that the actions of
the medical doctor were in line with Article 2 (1) WTL, there is no
reason for the Public Prosecution Service to assume the doctor’s
actions are illegal.82 Although the government states the RRC is not
a penal authority and it does not infringe upon the Public Prosecu-
tion Service’s right to prosecute, it has an important (indirect) saying
in the actions of the latter.83 In other words, when the RRC provides
its approval, the Public Prosecution Service does not investigate the
matter. In case of incompetence of the RRC or incompatibility of the
doctor’s actions with the statutory due care criteria, the Public
Prosecution Service can decide to initiate criminal investigations. It
can also do so when at the moment the doctor notiﬁes the municipal
coroner it is not clear or doubtful that the euthanasia doctor can
invoke the exemption from criminal liability out of Article 293 (2) or
Article 40 DPC, when the euthanasia was reported incorrectly or not
81 Stcrt. 2012, 26899.
82 Kamerstukken I 2000/01, 26691, nr. 137b, p. 27.
83 Stcrt. 2012, 26899.
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performed by a medical doctor.84 Finally, Article 14 WTL does not
prevent members of the RRC from testifying during the criminal
investigation or in court about the written and oral statements the
doctor has made.
3.2 The Legal Position of the Medical Doctor
Similar to the police use of force investigations, the actions of the
euthanasia doctor are examined a posteriori. If a doctor falsely re-
ports, he faces 1 month of imprisonment and a ﬁne of the second
category at its maximum according to Article 81 (1) WLB. Generally
within 6 weeks the RRC decides whether the actions of the doctor
were in line with the statutory due care criteria of Article 2 WTL.85 In
order to do so, it can request a medical doctor to clarify his initial
report with additional written or oral statements.86 Whilst doing this,
the euthanasia doctor cannot be forced to cooperate.
So why do we discuss the reporting procedure for euthanasia
doctors in this research regarding the reporting procedure for police
oﬃcers who have used force? While, similar to the police oﬃcer, the
euthanasia doctor makes his report at the moment when he is still not
a suspect under Article 27 DCCP. This means he submits this noti-
ﬁcation in the pre-investigation phase (controlefase).87 In the past the
Advocate-General Fokkens of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands
(Hoge Raad) observed in this respect that the principle of nemo
tenetur plays no role at that particular moment.88 This is an obvious
observation of course, because in the pre-investigation phase there is
no suspect involved. Thus, the euthanasia doctor must fulﬁl his
obligation to report and no right to silence is awarded to him.
Moreover, similar to the police oﬃcer he will be punished for making
false statements; a notiﬁcation of a natural death means he risks three
years of imprisonment and a ﬁne of the fourth category on the basis
of Article 228 DPC. At the same time he loses his opportunity to
84 Ibid. Or it can do so when prosecution is requested on the basis of Art. 12
DCCP.
85 Art. 9 (1) WTL.
86 Art. 8 (2) WTL.
87 W. L. J. M. Duijst, Gezondheidsstrafrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 2009), 97.
88 HR 30 november 1999, ECLI:NL:PHR:1999:AA3796, NJ 2000, 216. In this
case the euthanasia doctor had made false statements regarding an unnatural death.
Therefore the Dutch Supreme Court did not have to determine to what extent the
euthanasia reporting procedure violated the nemo tenetur principle, because the
euthanasia doctor could be punished for making false statements.
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invoke the exemption from criminal liability of Article 293 (2) and is
exposed to a prosecution on the basis of Article 293 (1) DPC.
Comparable to the police use of force investigation procedure, the
euthanasia doctor becomes a suspect from the moment the investi-
gation under the supervision of the public prosecutor regarding the
doctor’s suspected criminal actions begins.
Similar to the reporting procedure for police oﬃcials, the number
of euthanasia doctors that are annually criminally prosecuted is
slim.89 However, contrary to the debate regarding the question
whether the Police Instructions’ obligation to report violates the
nemo tenetur principle,90 scholars disagree with each other where it
comes to the reporting procedure for euthanasia doctors and the
admissibility of documents produced in the pre-investigation phase as
evidence in a subsequent criminal investigation.91 Pans, for instance,
is critical about the procedure under the WTL and thinks it harms the
legal certainty for the euthanasia doctor. She calls to prohibit the
Public Prosecution Service from using documents that are the pro-
duct of the obligation to report of the euthanasia doctor. Pans argues
to treat a positive judgment of the RRC as a warrant that the Public
Prosecution Service will not further investigate the case (besides when
new facts arise).92 However, it is doubtful whether such an argument
can hold taking into account that the family of the victim can appeal
a decision not to prosecute the doctor before the Court of Appeal on
the basis of Article 12 DCCP. Duijst and Veerman concur that the
use of the doctor’s report in a criminal trial is contrary to the prin-
89 See Leo Enthoven, Toetsingspraktijk euthanasie voor sommige artsen
onrechtvaardig’, (2016) 2 NJB 117, 121: this author points out that out of 3506
reports the RRC received in 2014, only four reports (so less than 0.1%) have led to a
judgment of the RRC that the actions of the doctor were inconsistent with the
statutory due care criteria and thus illegitimate. Furthermore, Enthoven points out
that euthanasia doctors do not have the possibility to appeal a decision of the RRC.
Knowing that it only involves a couple of doctors per year who are confronted with a
negative decision of the RRC, he states, does not alter the fact that these doctors
suﬀer a legal inequality compared to ordinary civilians in this respect.
90 In fact it can barely be called a debate because only a few scholars discuss this
topic and they all agree that it is inherent to the task of the police oﬃcer that he must
provide information out of which a criminal investigation can follow.
91 E. Delbeke, Juridische aspecten van zorgverlening aan het levenseinde (Antwer-
pen: Intersentia, 2012).
92 Pans (n 72 above), 127–128.
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ciple of nemo tenetur and, thus, to Article 6 ECHR.93 Others warn
this might be construed as illegally obtained evidence or openly
question the compatibility of the WTL reporting procedure with the
ECHR.94
This research did not ﬁnd a court ruling on the compatibility of
the WTL obligation to report with the principle of nemo tenetur. As a
result we cannot make a comparison about the legal validity of the
Police Instructions’ reporting procedure with that of the WTL on the
basis of judicial precedents. However, it is worth noting that scholars
in the debate regarding the euthanasia reporting procedure have
uniformly raised questions about it and doubted its compatibility
with the nemo tenetur principle. Until now such a scholarly debate
has not taken place with respect to the Police Instructions’ reporting
procedure in case of a police oﬃcer’s serious use of force. This is even
more remarkable when we take the following into account.
It is clear that the task of the police oﬃcer and the medical doctor
who performs euthanasia diﬀers. In principle a police oﬃcer must
respond to the unlawful conduct of civilians, which could ultimately
mean that he has to use severe force in order to stop it. A euthanasia
doctor can decide for himself whether he is willing to perform eu-
thanasia on his patient – and thereby wants to encroach upon the
right to life of a civilian – as long as he acts in compliance with the
law. So in other words, a police oﬃcer has a duty to act and a medical
doctor can choose to act. A doctor may for instance refuse to perform
euthanasia at the request of his patient, when this conﬂicts with his
personal (religious) belief.
Though in our opinion this freedom of choice’ for the medical
doctor can also sometimes be a matter of perception. According to
the law he can make his own decision, that is obvious. However, it
has been illustrated by a number of cases that euthanasia doctors
performed euthanasia on their patients when this was not in com-
pliance with the law, but at the same time their patients begged these
doctors to do so in order to stop their suﬀering. Then a medical
doctor has freedom of choice, but the patient puts a heavy moral
burden on his shoulders. What the police oﬃcer and the euthanasia
doctor do share is that, in the end, both of them are individually
criminally responsible when their actions turn out to be illegitimate
93 W. L. J. M. Duijst and G. Veerman, Niemand behalve de arts?’ in: A. den Exter
(ed.), De euthanasiewet: grondrechten onder druk? (Budel: Damon, 2006), 130–149.
94 B. D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., Evaluatie Wet toetsing levensbee¨indiging op
verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding (Den Haag: ZonMw, 2007).
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and in that case they can invoke an exemption from criminal liability.
This is something they share with every civilian.
Thus, euthanasia doctors have the liberty to choose to perform
euthanasia, whereas police oﬃcers in general have the duty to act
(which could ultimately mean: to use severe force). So would one not
expect that the legal debate becomes more intense, when the freedom
of choice is more limited (and thus the extent in which one is com-
pelled to act is greater)? In our opinion both the police oﬃcer and the
euthanasia doctor perform a task assigned to them by the Dutch
legislator for the public good, however, the euthanasia doctor can
refuse to perform this task when he deems this is appropriate.
Therefore, we believe that in relation to the debate on nemo tenetur,
the Police Instructions’ reporting procedure at least deserves the same
level of scholarly attention as the debate regarding the euthanasia
reporting procedure.
In the end, it becomes clear that both procedures are confronted
with the same problem: information that is obtained by a legal duty
to testify in the pre-investigation phase, can later on be used against
this same person in a criminal investigation. Scholars agree that, in
relation to the euthanasia reporting procedure, this violates the nemo
tenetur principle. However, due to the absence of case law this rea-
soning cannot be supported by judicial precedents. Then the question
is, to what extent is the use of this kind of information allowed under
the ECHR? In order to test the compatibility of the police reporting
procedure with the ECHR, this research will now discuss the
ECtHR’s case law regarding the admissibility of evidence established
in the pre-investigation phase in a subsequent criminal investigation.
By nature the following overview of the Court’s case law is a casuistic
one. This is compounded by the fact that it involves a Court, which is
famous for deciding a case in light of the circumstances of the case.
Nevertheless, it contains signiﬁcant elements that the Court will
presumably take into account when – one day – it has to rule on the
Police Instructions’ reporting procedure. A discussion of these ele-
ments in relation to the police reporting procedure follows in the ﬁfth
chapter of this research.
IV THE LEGAL POSITION OF A WITNESS AND THE
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The principle of nemo tenetur is not codiﬁed in Article 6 ECHR as
such. Nevertheless, the Strasbourg court has ruled in the case of John
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Murray v. the United Kingdom that the principle, taken together with
the right to silence, is fundamental for the right to a fair trial as
codiﬁed in Article 6 (1) ECHR.95 It is important to keep in mind that
Article 6 ECHR and the right to silence can only be invoked by a
suspect, meaning an individual facing a criminal charge.96 According
to the case law of the Court, the moment a criminal charge begins is
when there is an ‘‘oﬃcial notiﬁcation given to an individual by the
competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a crim-
inal oﬀence’’.97 Against this background it is normally not illegal to
compel a non-suspect – such as a witness – to testify. However, the
ECtHR has ruled in several cases that sometimes statements that are
made during the pre-investigation phase by a witness cannot be used
as evidence in a criminal trial.
Let us start with the case of Saunders v. the United Kingdom.98 In
this case the applicant was forced on the basis of domestic law to
cooperate in an administrative investigation. During this investiga-
tion he was prosecuted for the same matter. In court the statements
he had made during the administrative investigation, and which were
incriminating to him, were used to disprove his plea of innocence.
The ECtHR stated that ‘‘the Court’s sole concern in the present case
is with the use made of the relevant statements at the applicant’s
criminal trial’’. It held that:
[T]he right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be conﬁned to state-
ments of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which are directly incrimi-
nating. Testimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its face to be of
a non-incriminating nature – such as exculpatory remarks or mere information
on questions of fact –may later be deployed in criminal proceedings in support of
the prosecution case, for example to contradict or cast doubt upon other state-
ments of the accused or evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise
undermine his credibility. (…) In sum, the evidence available to the Court sup-
95 Judgment in case of John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996,
European Court of Human Rights (No. 18731/91), para. 45.
96 E. J.Koops,Het decryptiebevel en het nemo-teneturbeginsel. Nopen ontwikkelingen
sinds 2000 tot invoering van een ontsleutelplicht voor verdachten? (Onderzoek en beleid,
nr. 305, Den Haag/Meppel: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum/
Boom Lemma uitgevers, 2012), 48. See also the judgment in case Allan v. the United
Kingdom, 5 November 2002, European Court of Human Rights (No. 48539/99), para.
50.
97 Judgment in case of Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, European Court of Human
Rights (No. 8130/78), para. 73.
98 Judgment in case of Saunders v. the United Kingdom, 17 December 1996,
European Court of Human Rights (No. 19187/91).
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ports the claim that the transcripts of the applicant’s answers, whether directly
self-incriminating or not, were used in the course of the proceedings in a manner
which sought to incriminate the applicant.99
Here we have identiﬁed the ﬁrst important elements the ECtHR takes
into account in order to assess the extent to which the nemo tenetur
principle is violated. It is also an important argument to convince
those who claim – such as the Dutch government and several lawyers
and civil servants we have spoken to – that the notiﬁcation form of
the Police Instructions does not violate the nemo tenetur principle
because it merely entails factual information. The judgment in the
case of Saunders clearly illustrates that this kind of information may
not be used to disprove the statements of innocence of the suspect
that provided this same information. So this also applies in relation
to a police oﬃcer who has used force.
The Court in Saunders also made clear that the applicant was
obliged to make the statements, because he could not invoke a right to
silence and his refusal to respond would be punished with two years of
imprisonment. Here we can see clear parallels with the reporting pro-
cedure for police oﬃcers that have used force, who are obliged to report
and cannot use the right to silence, because they are not a suspect at the
moment they notify their superior. At the same time they face disci-
plinary and criminal sanctions for not (truthfully) reporting about the
course of events. The Court in Saunders also stated that the public
interest of the ﬁght against fraud could not serve as a justiﬁcation for
this course of events. So does this mean that this also contradicts the
argument of those who claim that the use of force is inherent to the
position of authority of the police, and that the public interest in
properly investigating such a use of force justiﬁes the fact that a police
oﬃcer should provide this informationwhile risking that itmay be used
against him as criminal evidence at a later stage? We believe it does. In
the end, theECtHR inSaunders ruled the principle of nemo teneturwas
violated,100 which is an important indication that the same can be
observed regarding the police reporting procedure.
Besides Saunders we mention other cases in this respect. In Zai-
chenko v. Russia101 the Court held that:
99 Ibid, paras. 71–72.
100 Ibid, paras. 67–76, in particular para. 74.
101 Judgment in case of Zaichenko v. Russia, 18 February 2010, European Court of
Human Rights (No. 39660/02).
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[B]eing in a rather stressful situation and given the relatively quick sequence of
the events, it was unlikely that the applicant could reasonably appreciate
without a proper notice the consequences of his being questioned in pro-
ceedings which then formed the basis for his prosecution for a criminal oﬀence.
Since the judgment was primarily based on these statements and the
consequences thereof were not remedied in court, the Court held
there was a violation of Article 6 ECHR.102 This is something that
normally does not apply to cases of police use of force. As mentioned
before there are often more pieces of evidence available than solely
the notiﬁcation form and the testimony of the superior. It will only be
a problem in the police use of force investigations when these sources
of information constitute the only evidence that is available and on
which the charges are based in a subsequent criminal trial. The latter
scenario is centralized in this research.
As inZaichenko, theECtHRused a similar reasoning inShabelnik v.
Ukraine. In this case the applicant had made statements as a witness
that soon turned out to be self-incriminating. The Court held that the
right to legal aid in the pre-prosecution stage was violated because a
confusing situation was created in which the applicant was told he had
the right not to incriminate himself and at the same time his obligation
to respondwas recalled. Seeing that hewas not able to speak to a lawyer
and that his conviction was mainly based on these statements, the
Court ruled that Article 6 of the Convention was violated.103 We be-
lieve that this aspect has already been taken into account in the present
course of events under the police reporting procedure. In the intro-
duction of this research it has been pointed out that the police has
installed a group of top lawyers, and it is likely (as we have heard from
someother lawyers that have dealt with cases of police use of force) that
these lawyers are immediately notiﬁed when an oﬃcer has used vio-
lence. That way the police oﬃcer can be briefed about his legal position
and his rights as a suspect or a witness, preferably before he has re-
ported this to his superior. However, we have received this information
from a lawyer operating in one police region only, and it is not clear (we
would sayunlikely) that this is also the case in other police regions. So in
that sense the problem has not yet been entirely resolved.
Furthermore, in Heaney and McGuineness v. Ireland, in which the
applicant’s refusal to make statements was punished by law with
102 Ibid, paras. 55 and 58–60.
103 Judgment in case of Shabelnik v. Ukraine, 19 February 2009, European Court
of Human Rights (No. 16404/03), paras. 57–60.
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6 months of imprisonment, the Court ruled that the public interest
could never justify a provision that violates the core of the principle
of nemo tenetur, which has at its core the right to silence.104 Here we
can make similar observations regarding the police reporting proce-
dure as we have done in relation to Saunders: the public interest in a
proper investigation of the police use of force cannot justify a vio-
lation of the nemo tenetur principle. As an extension in Shannon v.
the United Kingdom, it was held this could be permissible in the case
of a non-suspect and when there were no intentions to prosecute that
person.105 However, this – in our opinion – is a rather artiﬁcial dis-
tinction the Court makes in its judgment, because this intention to
prosecute a police oﬃcer can also arise later on, being the result of a
successful complaint of an injured person on the basis of Article 12
DCCP. Likewise, the Court’s judgment inO’Halloran and Francis v. the
United Kingdom made clear that there was no violation of Article 6
ECHR when a refusal to make statements is punished with a small
punishment (for instance aﬁne) and the statement itself is onlypartof the
broader body of evidence for which the accused can provide coun-
terevidence.106Regarding the latter observationwehave alreadypointed
out that the problemof nemo tenetur indeed plays a smaller role in cases
where there are also other pieces of evidence available. However, our
research focuses on those cases to which this does not apply.
In sum, according to the ECtHR the use of the notiﬁcation form
and the testimony of the superior as evidence is most problematic in
cases where the conviction mainly rests on this information, or where
this information is used to disprove the statements of innocence made
by the police oﬃcer who has used violence and has provided this
information. Besides, the public interest of proper investigation into
the police use of force cannot justify a violation of an oﬃcer’s right
against forced self-incrimination. When we, therefore, take into ac-
count that the disciplinary and criminal sanctions for a police
oﬃcer – who does not (truthfully) report about his used force – are
not to be seen as small punishments, we cannot but conclude that the
police reporting procedure does not hold in light of the requirements
the ECtHR has formulated in relation to the principle of nemo
104 Judgment in case of Heaney and McGuineness v. Ireland, 21 December 2000,
European Court of Human Rights (No. 34720/97), paras. 57–58.
105 Judgment in case of Shannon v. the United Kingdom, 4 October 2005, European
Court of Human Rights (No. 6563/03), para. 38.
106 Judgment in case ofO’Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom, 29 June 2007,
European Court of Human Rights (Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02), paras. 56–62.
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tenetur. In our opinion a police oﬃcer must always have the right to
consult a lawyer before he reports about the force he has used to his
superior. Furthermore, we ask ourselves what is the reason for not
excluding the notiﬁcation form and corresponding documents the
oﬃcer has made – as well as the testimony of the superior – as evi-
dence in court, when we have been told that this information is
normally not used as criminal evidence on which the charges and a
later conviction are based. Why not exclude the possibility of using
something one never uses?
We conclude this overview by comparing the line of reasoning of the
abovementioned case of O’Halloran and Francis, in which the obliga-
tion to respond was discussed with respect to traﬃc laws, with a
statement of Timmer and others in 1996. InO’Halloran and Francis the
Court ruled that because of the speciﬁc nature and the enforceability of
traﬃc laws, as well as the limited role of the obligation to respond,
certain obligations could be imposed upon car owners. It held that:
Those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to have accepted
certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating
to motor vehicles, and in the legal framework of the United Kingdom these
responsibilities include the obligation, in the event of suspected commission of
road-traﬃc oﬀences, to inform the authorities of the identity of the driver on
that occasion.107
Timmer and others came to a similar conclusion in their report in
1996. They consider the fact that an oﬃcer must truthfully make an
oﬃcial report about his use of force not as something in defense of his
innocence but rather as a logical consequence of the monopoly on
violence of the public authorities and, therefore, the oﬃcer just has to
accept this obligation.108 We have already pointed out that this public
interest argument’ does not hold in light of the case law of the ECtHR.
V THE COMPATIBILITY OF ARTICLE 17 POLICE
INSTRUCTIONS WITH ARTICLE 6 ECHR
We have seen that according to the ECtHR the use of evidence ob-
tained from a non-suspect who has a legal obligation to respond in a
subsequent criminal investigation can lead to a violation of the prin-
ciple of nemo tenetur under Article 6 ECHR. This does not only relate
107 Ibid, para. 57.
108 Timmer, Naeye´ and Van der Steeg (n 23 above), 70.
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to directly incriminating statements but to explanatory factual state-
ments as well. As in each decision of the ECtHR the speciﬁc cir-
cumstances of the case play a role. In the light of this research
important aspects in the Court’s reasoning are the extent of coercion
under which the evidence is obtained, the sanction in case of non-
compliance with the obligation to respond, whether there is a con-
fusing situation for the applicant, the applicant’s possibilities of
contacting a lawyer and the degree to which the conviction is based on
the evidence obtained in a compulsive manner during the pre-inves-
tigation phase. The Court stipulated that the public interest cannot be
used to justify procedures that infringe upon the core aspects of the
right to silence which is the core of the principle of nemo tenetur.
Finally, the Court has made it clear that an obligation to respond can
be acceptable where there is no intention to prosecute a non-suspect.
So what does this mean for the Police Instructions´ reporting proce-
dure in the case of serious use of force by police oﬃcers? First we have
seen that in practice some oﬃcers ﬁll in the notiﬁcation form themselves.
On top of that, sometimes the police oﬃcer’s emotional and situational
aspects are reported and taken into account during the reporting pro-
cedure. One can say this is the responsibility of the police oﬃcer himself
because he has no legal obligation to ﬁll in this form or to speak about
more than just the bare facts and circumstancesof the event.However, as
theNational Ombudsman indicates in his report, some police oﬃcers do
arrive in an emotional state at the bureau after they have used force.
When oﬃcers at that particular point in time have to inform their
superior, they will not always be conscious of the implications self-in-
criminating statements can have for them in a subsequent criminal
investigation. Without a clear warning for the oﬃcer as regards the self-
incriminating eﬀects of his complete story, a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination seems to be at stake here.
On the other hand, we do understand the pivotal importance of
the police use of force being reported properly and duly. We agree
that at the moment the oﬃcer reports to his superior one must start
from the assumption that the oﬃcer acted in line with the Police
Instructions. We also understand how important it is for the oﬃcer
from a psychological point of view to share his story as a non-suspect
with his superior. It must be avoided that an oﬃcer reports unreliably
about the force he has used, in the light of the oﬃcer’s as well as
society’s interests. Even though we have pointed out that according
to its internal rules the NPIID does not take the notiﬁcation form
into account whilst carrying out its investigation, the fact remains
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that at this time the public prosecutor can obtain a variety of evidence
that is based on the oﬃcer’s report. Therefore, we have come up with
the following solution.
We prefer not to alter the moment the investigation phase begins
under the Police Instructions. A small amendment suﬃces to avoid an
incompatibility of the Police Instructions’ reporting procedure with
Article 6 ECHR. Whether or not the superior of the police oﬃcer is
seen as the author of the notiﬁcation form, the fact remains that this
form contains information that has been obtained from the oﬃcer
who used force and has a legal obligation to report about this used
force to his superior. Especially in those cases in which this infor-
mation is used to disprove the oﬃcer’s claim of being innocent. The
government can adopt a provision under the Police Instructions that
excludes the notiﬁcation form, as well as any documents that are
drafted following the oﬃcer’s report, and the testimony of the
superior as evidence in a subsequent criminal investigation against
this oﬃcer. Such an approach would be in line with the already
existing Kingdom Act concerning Safety Investigation Board
(Rijkswet Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid).109 Following Article 52 (1)
of this Act the Dutch Safety Board can question witnesses under
oath, which means these witnesses can be compelled to provide self-
incriminating information. In order to prevent a violation of the right
against forced self-incrimination, this Act excludes the Dutch Safety
Board’s documents (Article 69 (1)(f)) and the testimony of the
Board’s investigators (Article 69 (4)) as evidence in court, notwith-
standing the fact that the Board’s documents only contain factual
information that has been documented by the Board itself. See in this
respect also the Articles 30–32 of the Parliamentary Inquiry Act (Wet
op de parlementaire enqueˆte 2008).110 Obviously, this does not mean
that the notiﬁcation form and the documents that are drafted on the
basis of the oﬃcer’s report cannot be used in favor of the police
oﬃcer, because – as pointed out before – the rules regarding evidence
under the DCCP only relate to those pieces of evidence that
incriminate the suspect.111 In theory the government could repeat its
109 Stb. 2004, 677.
110 Stb. 2008, 148.
111 T. Kooijmans and J. B. H. M. Simmelink, De verhouding tussen het stra-
frechtelijk onderzoek en het onderzoek door de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid (Til-
burg: Universiteit van Tilburg, 2007), 15; T. Kooijmans et al., Het gebruik van
onderzoeksinformatie en rapporten van de Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid in juridische
procedures (Tilburg: Tilburg University, 2014), 20.
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demand that a police oﬃcer only speaks about the facts and cir-
cumstances of the force he has used. However, in the light of the
National Ombudsman’s report this does not seem a fruitful solution.
The Ministry of Security and Justice has informed us that at this
very moment the Police Instructions, including its reporting proce-
dure, is under review. Changes to the Police Instructions are expected
to enter into force in 2016. When the government refrains to reform
the present system in the way as is proposed in this research, we fear it
is not the question if but when a Dutch court or the ECtHR itself will
rule the Police Instructions’ reporting procedure violates Article 6
ECHR. Then just one question remains: how serious is this problem
in actual practice? Especially if we take into account the possibility
for the Public Prosecution Service to reach a settlement with the
police oﬃcer before an actual court case takes place, we need to
examine to what extent the notiﬁcation form and other relevant
documents, as well as the superior’s testimony, are admitted in court
as evidence and to what extent a subsequent conviction is based on
these pieces of evidence.
Following a brief survey amongst eight lawyers who – to a greater
or lesser extent – have dealt with police use of force cases in the past,
the following indications come forward. Per year the number of
criminal cases against police oﬃcers who have used force is limited.
Most of the cases that are actually brought before a court result from
a complaint of a citizen to a Court of Appeal on the basis of Article
12 DCCP for the initial non-prosecution of a police oﬃcer by the
Public Prosecution Service. In some cases it still happens that the
police oﬃcer himself – or together with his superior – ﬁlls in the
prescribed notiﬁcation form. The documents that are produced out of
the oﬃcer’s report only relate to the facts, the circumstances and the
consequences of the incident, and these documents do not normally
contain any contextual or emotional information provided by the
oﬃcer. However, in one case a superior was asked by the Public
Prosecution Service to pose some additional questions to the police
oﬃcer, after which the answers to these questions were recorded in an
oﬃcial report under oath. This then became part of the criminal ﬁle.
That way an extension of the reporting procedure had taken place.
Two lawyers conﬁrmed that the notiﬁcation form is part of the ﬁle in
a criminal investigation against the police oﬃcer who has used force.
It appears this mainly happens in non-severe police use of force cases,
because as mentioned earlier the NPIID – in light of the tension
between the oﬃcer’s obligation to report and his right to remain
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silent as a suspect – tries to avoid that the notiﬁcation form becomes
a part of the criminal ﬁle. Finally, according to the eight lawyers it
never occurred that a police oﬃcer was convicted on the basis of the
notiﬁcation form, nor did it occur that a superior was summoned to
testify against the reporting police oﬃcer. However, since this brief
survey does not equal an extensive empirical study more research is
needed in order to make solid statements in this respect.
And even when one claims that there is no genuine problem at
stake here because criminal investigations against police oﬃcers who
have used serious force rarely take place – for instance there are
approximately 60.000 police oﬃcers in The Netherlands112 who arrest
about 300.000–400.000 suspects per year out of almost 17 million
inhabitants,113 and the number of cases in which the NPIID inves-
tigated ﬁrearm shooting by police oﬃcers remained low during the
last years: 23 (2009), 25 (2010), 30 (2011), 24 (2012), 33 (2013) and 33
(2014)114 – does this then mean that the existing law on the police use
of force investigations should not be improved for the rare cases in
which the identiﬁed problem in this research can play a role in the
future? The solution that we propose to this problem is to make an
easy and, at least in our opinion, politically non-sensitive amend-
ment. Thus what reason can there be to oppose a statutory provision
which explicitly excludes the notiﬁcation form, the witness testimony
of the superior and the reports that the police oﬃcer has made fol-
lowing his use of force being used as evidence in subsequent court
112 Nationale Politie, Jaarverslag Nationale Politie 2014 (Nationale Politie, 20
May 2015) available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/jaarverslagen/2015/05/20/nationale-politie/06-venj-vi-nationale-politie-
jaarverslag-2014-en-ﬁnanciele-verantwoording.pdf (last accessed 12 April 2016).
113 See for instance an overview of the years 2009–2013: Centraal Bureau voor de
Statistiek, Registraties en aanhoudingen van verdachten; nationaliteit’ (Centraal Bu-
reau voor de Statistiek, 19 October 2015) http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/
?DM=SLNL&PA=82315NED&D1=0-1,12,18,22,25-26&D2=0&D3=0-1,6,9,24,
26&D4=1-2&D5=10-14&HDR=G4,G1,G3&STB=T,G2&VW=T (last accessed
13 April 2016). The number of arrested suspects per year: 423.420 (2009), 386.210
(2010), 376.470 (2011), 350.080 (2012), 317.740 (2013) and 309.280 (2014). See also
the number of inhabitants in The Netherlands: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek,
Bevolkingsteller’ (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 20 October 2015) http://www.
cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bevolking/cijfers/extra/bevolkingsteller.htm (last accessed
12 April 2016).
114 Rijksrecherche, Rijksrecherche onderzocht totaal 33 schietincidenten in 2014’
(Rijksrecherche, 13 February 2015) available at http://www.rijksrecherche.nl/alge
mene-onderdelen/uitgebreid-zoeken/@163147/rijksrecherche/ (last accessed 12 April
2016).
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proceedings? Whereas in some professions people are judged and
remembered on their best moments and their biggest achievements,
for instance scientists and artists. Others, such as truck drivers and
policemen, are judged on their weakest moments and the potential
mistake they have made once in their long-lasting career. At those
vulnerable moments it is important to have a legal system in place
that at least provides them – when needed – with the same rights that
every suspect is entitled to during a criminal investigation. We
therefore call upon the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, and
ﬁnally the Dutch legislator, to take note of our proposition and to
incorporate it into the revised Police Instructions that are expected to
enter into force in 2016.
VI CONCLUSION
This study has examined the compatibility of the Police Instructions’
obligation to report in the severe police use of force cases with the
principle of nemo tenetur under Article 6 ECHR. This research has
pointed out that the Dutch government was aware of a possible
inconsistency in the reporting procedure with Article 6 ECHR at the
time this procedure was incorporated. In its regulation the govern-
ment has made clear that a balance had to be struck between the
notions of providing information’ and self-incrimination’. Where the
government assumes this balance is maintained under the present
legal system, this research has uncovered an imbalance in disfavor of
police oﬃcers. A police oﬃcial has the obligation to notify his
superior about the force he has used, and under the present system
the resulting notiﬁcation form and other related documents, as well as
the witness testimony of the superior to whom the report was made,
can be used as evidence during the subsequent criminal trial against
this oﬃcer. The factual information directly derives from the police
oﬃcer and it sometimes occurs that police oﬃcers themselves ﬁll in
the notiﬁcation form or that they report about the emotional and
situational aspects of the event.
This research has also discussed the reporting procedure for
medical doctors who performed euthanasia on their patient. It found
out that scholars in the euthanasia debate claim that such a procedure
violates the nemo tenetur principle when the doctor’s report is used in
a criminal trial. By analogy, these arguments could also apply to the
Police Instructions’ reporting procedure in the case of a police oﬃ-
cer’s serious use of force. Furthermore, due to the absence of Dutch
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court rulings on the compatibility of the euthanasia and the Police
Instructions’ reporting procedure with the principle of nemo tenetur,
this research has examined the case law of the ECtHR. It concludes
that several elements of the Police Instructions’ reporting procedure
in case of serious use of force go against the case law of the ECtHR.
As a result, the present reporting procedure of the Police
Instructions is likely to violate the principle of nemo tenetur under
Article 6 ECHR when the notiﬁcation form and related documents or
the testimony of the superior are used to disprove the oﬃcer’s claim
of innocence or when the criminal charges and a subsequent con-
viction is solely based on these pieces of evidence. A small amend-
ment to the Police Instructions in order to eliminate the possibility for
the public prosecutor to use the aforementioned means of evidence
can solve this problem, especially when we realize that in most cases
the public prosecutor never needs to use these pieces of information
as evidence.
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